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LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND
JURISPRUDENCE
The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence. By Jeffrie
G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984.
Reviewed by Jerome E. Bickenbach*
This book contains mainstream Anglo-American philosophy of law
at its best. It is supremely self-confident in tone. There is no waste, no
hesitation, no rhetoric. Each topic or problem considered is tersely summarized and subjected to rigorous philosophical analysis. Key underlying philosophical issues are isolated, premises are established and arguments are advanced in rapid succession. The hazy but plausible insight, the ambiguous proposition or inadequate counterexample is exposed, a series of arguments is marshalled and, then, the offending
untruth is set aside. Where doubt remains, the authors remind the
reader that this is only an introductory text and detail the work yet to
be done. The self-confidence, moreover, is augmented with a thoroughgoing optimism about progress. Hazy, ambiguous or untrue claims,
though rooted out and set aside, are not discarded. Every inadequate
attempt leaves behind a residue, a partial truth upon which better attempts build. We are led to believe that jurisprudential progress is a
slow accretion of insight and argument, bringing us ever closer to the
complete story, the whole truth.
The authors' self-confidence, optimism and unabashed gusto are
infectious; and that is undoubtedly a good thing. The book is an introduction designed to grab students' attention, to turn them on to a topic
that might not sell on its own. Hence, this book is intentionally a sexy
sampler of what is happening at the cutting edge of philosophy of law,
at least as that discipline is understood by those American analytic philosophers wedded to political liberalism.
Both authors are clear about the positions and arguments that
they think are defensible and correct. They write as advocates for philosophical positions and their style is adversarial throughout. They have
no interest in watering down the material. Much that appears in this
volume has also appeared, or will appear, in substantially the same
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form, in professional journals. At the same time, however, the material
is accessible principally because of the single most significant virtue of
analytic philosophy - clarity.
Murphy and Coleman's confidence and optimism is in part a result
of their analytic philosophical methodology, one that is ahistorical and
purports to be value-neutral and non-ideological. However, the major
cause of their self-assured tone is the authors' unquestioned assumption
about the political perspective of liberalism. This reliance supplies
many of the answers to fundamental moral and political questions.
Thus, the authors only have to make sure that the results of their analyses accord with liberalism's central vision - an individualism supported by rights, defended by a neutral, non-paternalistic state which
guarantees that most forms of interpersonal activity are modelled on
the machinery of the market. The adoption of this perspective enables
the authors to avoid the complications and uncertainties that would result from challenges to their political stance. In this volume, left or
radical critiques of law and liberalism are more or less ignored. Such
ideas do not appear to be worth the argumentative bullets it would take
to blow them off the conceptual landscape.'
Although one may get the distinct impression that the topics covered here coincide with the research interests of the two authors, the
range is impressively broad for the limited scope of the book. Moreover, a strong case is made, primarily by Coleman, for expanding the
range of issues in and about law that ought to be open to philosophical
treatment. This novelty adds to the excitement of the book. Philosophy
of law has been a growing industry since H. L. A. Hart published The
Concept of Law in 1961 and more or less resurrected the field, but it is
exhilarating to be reminded that there is still much to explore.
The book divides naturally and perhaps intentionally into two
parts - the first three chapters written by Murphy and the remaining
two written by Coleman. Murphy provides jurisprudential and ethical
background of the sort standardly covered by introductory courses in
philosophy of law. Building on this, Coleman explores a range of more
1 Most conspicuously absent is any reference or response to those radical and highly prolific
and provocative scholars who align themselves with what has come to be called the Critical Legal
Studies Movement (C.L.S.). Marxists, as a rule, tend not to turn their attention to jurisprudential
issues, so it is forgivable that Murphy and Coleman ignore Marxist critique for the purposes of
their introductory text. However, to ignore the mountains of material produced by the C.L.S.
Movement, which for the most part challenges the very assumptions that go unchallenged in this
book, is merely to insulate one's arguments from effective response. Moreover, as we shall see
below, Murphy and Coleman implicitly share with the C.L.S. Movement the thesis that concrete
legal systems embody a political ideology. For a recent survey of the C.L.S. Movement, see
Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politicsand the CriticalLegal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of
American Legal Thought (1984), 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199.
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specific questions, more closely linked with substantive law, that are
currently under professional, philosophical scrutiny.
Chapter 1 is a compact review of the major (non-Marxist, nonradical) theories of the nature of law: classical natural law, John Austin's legal positivism, H. L. A. Hart's legal positivism, American legal
realism, and new versions of natural law, by which Murphy primarily
means Ronald Dworkin's various jurisprudential views. The theories
flow smoothly one into the other. Earlier views are held out as precursors to later ones. Refinements are shown to be the result of responses
to standard objections raised against first attempts; the legal thinker
who follows is always seen as building upon the work of his predecessors. Dworkin is the grand synthesizer, the current state-of-the-art jurist who has meshed together all of the "correct" insights of his
predecessors.2
Given that Murphy views Dworkin's account of the nature of law
to be founded on the insight that morality and moral reasoning are
essential components of the concept of law, he moves on in Chapter 2
to consider moral theory and its application to law. Although there are
a handful of pages devoted to philosophical responses to moral scepticism and to the possibility of moral objectivity, the main purpose of
this chapter is to introduce two doctrines that dominate the rest of the
book - the competing liberal moral theories of utilitarianism and
Kantianism. Once these theories are perspicuously summarized, Murphy uses a cluster of problems in the area of freedom of speech and the
press to demonstrate how utilitarian and Kantian ideas suffuse the discussion, moving us back and forth from considerations of overall utility
and efficiency to considerations of rights. We are left convinced that
moral philosophy's input into the law consists of countervailing intuitions about the conflict between utility and justice, efficiency and
rights.
Chapter 3 deals with crime and punishment. Murphy's treatment
of punishment and its competing utilitarian and Kantian justifications
is standard and concise; as is his discussion of mental states, excuses
and the prospect of strict liability criminal law. He also includes a previously published 3 discussion of capital punishment, viewed from the
perspective of constitutional restrictions on cruel and unusual punishment. But the more interesting discussion involves the prior question of
2 Coleman & Murphy, The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence(1984) at
46-47.
1 Murphy, "Cruel and Unusual Punishments," in Stewart, ed., Law, Morality and Rights

(1983).
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why we have criminal law at all.
Murphy argues that criminalization requires special justification
because the criminal law and its supporting institutions of enforcement
and prosecution cede to the state powers that are potential radical intrusions into private lives. The mere necessity of protecting individual
rights from the conduct of others is not itself a justification for
criminalization since private means of enforcement and protection are
available. Nor can it be argued that crimes are essentially injuries to
the state, demanding state-enforced sanctions. The state has no rights
or values that may be jeopardized by criminal activity, only individuals
do.5 What, then, justifies the state in creating and enforcing criminal
law?
Murphy claims that the best approach to this question comes from
the libertarian analysis of Robert Nozick. Being a devoted "liberty
lover", Nozick is concerned with isolating the justifiable powers of the
"minimal state". Nozick argues, in part, that these powers are restricted to those the minimal state would need in order to fulfill the job
which free individuals, acting in their own self-interest, would agree to
"hire" the state to perform. As it happens, the protection of rights by
private means would be costly and inefficient. Given this, it is efficient
for the state to engage in the job of protecting rights by means of
criminalization, in order to prevent individuals from inflicting incompensable injuries or fear onto others. 6
Thus, it is a legitimate state function, one of the few Nozick would
allow, that Nozick acknowledges to protect efficiently and effectively
individual rights, particularly. rights to property and personal security,
by means of criminalization. Murphy argues that rights to property require protection by criminal means because few structures are as important to society as mechanisms for economic exchange, "if those
mechanisms become unglued, society itself would very likely become
unglued."' Thus, we have criminal laws against theft, but not libel.
Presumably the same could be said about industrial pollution, whitecollar crime and racial and sexual discrimination.
With Chapter 4, Coleman takes over with a treatment of philosophical problems involved in the private law areas of torts and contracts. At this point, the pace and the difficulty of the discussion in" Indeed, the "lover of liberty" would always prefer private means for the protection of individual rights; Coleman & Murphy, supra note 2, at 121.
5 Id. at 119.
e Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
" Supra note 2, at 121.
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crease because Coleman can rely on Murphy's stage-setting. Thus,
Coleman can proceed without having to debate a collection of key assumptions: that analytical philosophical techniques bring to legal issues
a value-neutral, ahistorical and non-ideological methodology; that this
methodology can, with sufficient cleverness, actually solve philosophical
issues in law; that individual rights exist prior to the state and are pivotal; that there is a conceptually clear distinction between the public
and private spheres; that the market provides the best model for understanding private legal relations; and that the central moral issue within
law is how best to resolve the antagonism between utilitarian and Kantian insights.
It is, therefore, with great economy that Coleman introduces in
Chapter 4 a raft of issues and questions that arise in tort and contract
law. Among other issues, Coleman considers how tort and contract law
can be conceptually distinguished from criminal law. His answer relies
on the private/public distinction: criminal law involves the public enforcement of public duties, torts the private enforcement of public duties, and contracts the private enforcement of private duties. He investigates rules of tort liability and assesses the fault system against
standards of cost effectiveness, retributive justice and compensatory
justice. He challenges the claims made by Calabresi and others for nofault tort schemes, and suggests problems with tort law's response to
automobile accidents. Turning to contract law, Coleman reviews
Charles Fried's analysis of contracts as promises before detailing his
response to Anthony Kronman's claim that contract law ought to satisfy public, rather than private, interests inasmuch as it enforces the
claims of distributive justice.
While this chapter is filled with ideas, it is merely a preparation
for the final chapter in which Coleman offers a masterly introduction to
the machinery, models and doctrines of economic analysis of law. Coleman shows how economic analysis has been applied to nuisance and
accident law, to contracts and even to criminal law. The chapter also
introduces game theory, in the context of litigation/settlement strategies, which is compared and contrasted with the standard Coasian and
Posnerian models of economic analysis. Coleman then surveys a collection of objections to economic analysis. With quick and lethal analytical blows, he cuts through what is to his mind the weakest objection that economic analysis involves a pernicious ideology - before going
on to more successful, but highly technical, objections that take economic analysis on its own terms. He also suggests ways in which, if
implemented in law, economic analysis would fail to secure the goals it
holds out as optimal.
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Enough has been said to indicate the scope of this introduction to
philosophy of law. Yet it is undeniable that the combination of an analytic, philosophical methodology and the political perspective of liberalism makes many of the conclusions reached by the authors totally
predictable. When Murphy questions the need for criminal law, it is to
be expected that he would turn to Nozick's account of the necessary
evil of empowering the state to enforce individual rights. The analytic
methodology precludes an attempt to see that question in historical
terms, and the political perspective demands that individual rights
dominate the analysis. When Coleman turns to the objection that the
economic analysis of law is ideological - in that its central notion of
efficiency depends on willingness to pay, which in turn depends on capacity to pay (and therefore a methodological preference for one economic class over another) - it is inevitable that the objection will fail
since it challenges the unchallengeable doctrine that the market is neutral. As Coleman tellingly admits: ".

.

. the ideology argument is no

more nor less an objection to economic analysis than it is to markets
generally." 8 Given the assumptions of his treatment of legal questions,
Coleman feels no obligation to consider a critique of markets.
Despite the predictable conclusions and unquestioned assumptions,
it cannot be denied that this is a valuable introductory text. The book
contains a wealth of philosophical analysis and the arguments are professional and tight. Hence, anyone hoping to sustain a critique of liberalism in general and mainstream American philosophy of law in particular, has the task of addressing and answering these arguments. Yet
there is another level of interest in this book. Behind the dash and optimism, in the interstices of the knockdown argumentation, one can discern the hint of a substantial predicament for mainstream philosophy
of law, one not without its ironic dimension.
On the first page of this book, Murphy dutifully sets out a linchpin
distinction crucial to "the application of the rational techniques of the
discipline of philosophy to the subject matter of law." The distinction
is that between analytical jurisprudence - the logical or conceptual
analysis of key legal concepts like duty, responsibility, fault and negligence -

and normative jurisprudence -

the rational criticism and

evaluation of laws and legal institutions from moral, political, economic
and other points of view. Although Murphy credits the distinction to
John Austin, it is basic to all versions of legal positivism.
Within analytic philosophy, a similar distinction is raised. Concep,g Id. at 257.
9 Id. at I.
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tual analysis is purportedly a value-neutral, ahistorical and non-ideological rationality, a methodology of exploring and exposing the "logic"
of concepts. Given the neutrality of the methodology, moral and political judgments have always posed a problem for the analytic philosophical tradition. Bluntly, analytic philosophizing has either found nothing
rational about the process of moral or political evaluation, and has embraced moral subjectivism, relativism or some other form of moral
skepticism, or it has held that the objectivity of morality can proceed
rationally from a foundation of basic, intuitively obvious, empirically
grounded or otherwise unchallengeable moral axioms. For the most
part, however, analytic philosophers have contented themselves with
the clarification of moral issues, by means of conceptual analyses of
core moral concepts. It has always seemed suspicious that one could
generate value judgments using a value-neutral analysis of concepts
and an objective determination of the facts at issue. 1°
The political philosophy of liberalism has also traded on a distinction between neutral analysis, rule following or calculation and judgments about right and wrong, good and bad. As a political philosophy,
liberalism rests upon a familiar set of moral axioms: the primacy of
individual liberty and individual rights, the necessity for justifying state
interference with individual liberty, and the requirement that each individual be allowed to choose his or her own conception of the good life,
free from state coercion or paternalism. At the same time, however,
liberalism demands neutral and objective instrumentalities for the coordination of competing interests.
In the case of liberalism, moreover, this distinction has created an
antagonism between the public and the private, the objective and the
subjective. Liberalism's core moral axioms delineate a private sphere
within which each individual is free to make, and to act upon, judgments of value he or she chooses. In the public sphere, where conflicts
between individuals seeking to actualize their private conceptions of the
good life arise, a neutral and objective instrumentality is required to
harmonize these conflicts. For the liberal, the market has typically
stood as the ideal instrument, not only for resolving conflicts, but also
for doing so in a manner that does not impinge upon individual freedom. The virtues of cost-avoidance and other characterizations of efficiency have been, for the liberal, what the standards of logical coherence and consistency have been for the analytic philosopher. It is the
10The larger story of the modem predicament in analytic philosophy, faced with the challenge of the continental, hermeneutical tradition, is told in Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and
Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (1983).
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market that neutrally and fairly determines winners and losers among
those value consumers, who freely strive to realise their own personal
conceptions of the good life. The state's proper role is essentially that of
facilitating the pursuit of individual actors, rather than discovering and
furthering a common conception of the good life.11
All of this suggests that the methodology of analytic philosophy
and the tenets of legal positivism and liberalism are congenial partners,
each complementing and underwriting the other; and so it has been.
Yet Murphy and Coleman have uncovered tensions below the surface
of this veneer of co-operation. They have done so by bringing both liberal ideology and analytic methodology to the discussion of fundamental legal questions. Consequently, their approach has put pressure on
legal positivism, one that it may not be able to sustain.
The problem is simply that the more that liberals insist upon the
existence of individual rights, the less they will be able to understand
the foundations of a concrete legal system,
without finding embodied in it legal guarantees and protections of these
rights. In particular, for the liberal, the logic of constitutional rights is
fundamentally, not merely coincidentally or analogically, the logic of
natural rights. As Dworkin has argued, legal positivists have great difficulty in accounting for the nature of legal reasoning, as it exists in
concrete cases, since they reject the notion that there is an essential
moral and political content to law. In effect, Dworkin is saying that
law, as it is known in liberal states, only makes sense if it is morally
situated and essentially embodies the tenets of liberalism. 2
Over and over again, the authors of this volume reinforce this
view, without expressly aligning themselves with Dworkin. When Murphy discusses the constitutional questions of journalistic freedom of
speech and cruel and unusual punishment, he relies explicitly on the
doctrine of individual rights. Moreover, it would be implausible to insist
that his analyses are aimed at external moral criticism of the law;
rather, the point of his arguments is to disclose what freedom of speech
and cruel and unusual are legally. Coleman's discussions reflect a similar perspective. His concern throughout is to explore what is legally
demanded by underlying liberal doctrines.
The various assumptions about individual rights, the limited role
of the state and the priority of the market model of interaction are not
1 The major, recent exposition of the nature and inner tensions of liberalism is found in
Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975). For a sustained critique of liberalism from the perspective

of liberalism's conception of the self, see Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).

12 See Taking Rights Seriously (1977) Ch. 3, and "Natural"Law Revisited (1982), 34 U.
of Fla. L. Rev. 165.
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alien to the character of American law. Quite the opposite, these elements of the liberal ideology are inextricably a part of American law
and politics. They often determine the results of legal reasoning in constitutional law as well as in torts and contracts. In an important sense,
Murphy and Coleman are attempting to do what Dworkin's mythical
super-judge Hercules tries to do when he or she reasons towards the
solution of a particular legal question, by searching for those moral
principles that underlie legal rules and finding the best justification, in
terms of principles and political morality, for the legal structure as a
13
whole.
This suggests that Murphy and Coleman, as liberals, should be
committed to a version of natural law and, indeed, should strongly dissociate themselves from most versions of legal positivism. Yet, such a
commitment is at odds with the presumed ideological and moral neutrality of the analytic methodology they employ, for the kind of natural
law that seems to emanate from the book is one in which it is impossible to separate the analysis of centrally important legal concepts from
the ideological demands of liberalism. Indeed, it is a natural law jurisprudence for which analysis is simply a disclosure and delineation of
the requirements imposed on the law by liberal ideology. Gone is the
philosophical distinction between neutral analysis and moral evaluation.
Gone, too, is the legal positivist distinction between analytical and normative jurisprudence. As Murphy and Coleman amply demonstrate, a
philosophical understanding of American law reveals that it is ideologi14
cal in essence. Law, as some have said, is politics.
The irony is that this very insight is the basis of radical critiques
of the law, which have been so studiously ignored in this book, be they
Marxist critiques arguing that law is purely superstructural, neo-Marxist critiques arguing that law is a legitimating device for liberal ideology or any of the variety of left and radical critiques offered by the
Critical Legal Studies Movement. Naturally, Murphy and Coleman
would strenuously reject the suggestion that their arguments and analyses presuppose a natural law jurisprudence, or that their conclusions
about jurisprudential and substantive legal issues intentionally embody
the ideological claims of liberalism. However, the authors seem to be
faced with a dilemma. Assumptions about individual rights, the proper
role of the state, the separation of the private from the public and the
pivotal role of the market are either external to the law or constitute
" For Dworkin's characterization of the role and methodology of Hercules, see "Hard
Cases," supra note 12, at ch. 4.
14

See the C.L.S. Movement's sampler: Kairys, ed., The Politicsof Law (1982).
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aspects of law that make law intelligible as such. If the latter, Murphy
and Coleman are presupposing a natural law jurisprudence; if the former, it is appropriate to ask by what warrant do these authors purport
to find extra-legal moral and political doctrines embodied in substantive law.
Liberalism most likely requires a natural law jurisprudence and
the tensions this may generate are unavoidable. Murphy and Coleman
have unintentionally produced an introduction to the philosophy of law
that may reveal some of the internal tensions of liberalism itself by its
methodology, its unstated assumptions and its conclusions. Hence, for
those concerned with understanding the power and the persuasiveness
of liberalism and mainstream American legal philosophy, as well as for
those who are concerned with critiquing these institutions, The Philosophy of Law awaits.

